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Home > Modern History > National Studies > C Germany 1918-1939 > Germany 1918 - 1939: Kurt von Schleicher

 

• Outcomes
• Key features
• Introduction
• Background
• Role in the early days of the Weimar Republic
• Intrigue against the Treaty of Versailles
• Growth of Schleicher's power
• Imapct of the Great Depression on Germany - political effects
• The fall of Brüning
• Chancellor
• Assassination
• Notes
• Bibliography

Outcomes

A student:

H1.2	Analyses and evaluates the role of key features, issues, individuals, groups and events of selected twentieth-century studies
H2.1	Explains forces and ideas and assesses their significance in contributing to change and continuity during the twentieth century
	Extract from Modern History Stage 6 Syllabus © Board of Studies NSW 2004.

Principal Focus:

Students investigate the key features and issues of the history of Germany 1918 – 1939.

 

Key features and issues

• successes and failures of democracy
• changes in society
• the nature and impact of Nazism

From this tutorial you will learn about:

• the collapse of he Weimar Republic 1929 – 1933
• the rise of the Nazi Party (NSDAP) FROM 1923
• the impact of the Great Depression on Germany
• Hitler’s accession to power

This article connects the machinations of the German Army and their conspiracy with Hitler.

Introduction

Schleicher was a general with political gifts, but he was first and foremost an officer who saw the army as the guarantor of Germany's domestic tranquility.[1]

The murder of Major-General Kurt von Schleicher on 30 June 1934, The Night of the Long Knives, is often only given a passing mention by history books. After all, wasn't he the last chancellor of the failed experiment in democracy that was Weimar Germany? Why should history give a man whose period of governance lasted from 2 December 1932 to 28 January 1933 — not even two months — more than a cursory glance? However, a closer look at the career of General von Schleicher gives a much more interesting picture. It illustrates the manner in which the German Army cooperated with the various governments of the Weimar Republic to circumvent and subvert the Treaty of Versailles. It shows that Schleicher had his own vision of restoring Germany to a position of power in Europe. Whether he favoured the concept of the Republic or not is a moot point, but throughout his career he conspired to use the strength of the army and its resources to make Germany strong. It also suggests that officers of the army had more than a passing interest in the events of the night of 30 June and possibly openly colluded in von Schleicher's assassination.

By the end of 1933 the Weimar Republic had ended. Its last defender, General Kurt von Schleicher, was locked in a deadly game of intrigue with Adolph Hitler and the Nazi Party. The urbane Schleicher felt that he was capable of breaking the grip that the Nazis had in the German Reichstag by splitting the party and isolating Hitler. He was confident that he could achieve this as he had behind him the massive popular and moral power of President Hindenburg, and the strength of the German army.

Background

Born in 1882, Kurt von Schleicher was a member of an old Brandenburg military family. In 1900 he joined the army as a subaltern in the Third Foot Guards. Here he became close friends with Oskar von Hindenburg, the son of General Paul von Hindenburg who was later to become a hero of the First World War, Chief of the General Staff of the German Army and second president of the German Republic. When Hindenburg retired in 1911, Schleicher became a frequent visitor to the general's house where he became a firm favourite.

Early in his career von Schleicher found another strong patron in the form of General Wilhelm Groener, instructor at the War Academy. Groener considered Schleicher one of his most brilliant pupils. During the First World War von Schleicher served on the Eastern front where he won an Iron Cross but somehow incurred the displeasure of General Ludendorff and was sent to work at press headquarters. When Groener succeeded Ludendorff as head of the German Army, von Schleicher, now a major, became his personal adjutant. Von Schleicher displayed a talent for staff work and politics that made him "indispensable to his commanders".[2] It was his remarkable talents of organisation that enabled von Schleicher to make himself more powerful. He judiciously used his political, social, military and diplomatic contacts and skilfully intrigued in the shadows of the turbulent politics of post-war Germany.

Role in the early days of the Weimar Republic

Virtually from its inception, von Schleicher played an integral, though shadowy, role in the life of the Weimar Republic. As an aide to Groener, von Schleicher took part in the discussions that created the Ebert-Groener pact which probably decided the fate of the German Army under the Weimar Republic and of the Republic itself. This pact, according to Snyder, prevented the future creation of a republican army and made Germany "safe for militarism again".[3]

From the first both von Schleicher and General Groener were prepared to help create a strong government backed by the army. Von Schleicher's role can be seen in his persuasion of Friedrich Ebert, Germany's inaugural president, to acknowledge the army as the state's guardian against the revolutionary Worker and Soldiers' Councils during the initial turbulent year of the Republic. In 1920, when the units of the People's Marine Division surrounded the Chancellery and held the President and his cabinet hostage, it was von Schleicher who took the call from Ebert and sent in government troops to crush the mutiny.[4]

Between 1920 and 1923 Schleicher was responsible for much of the organising of the freikorps, organised units of ex-soldiers, which were to play an important role in the history of the young democracy. In the political unrest following the setting up of the Weimar Republic, the new government was faced with attacks from the extreme left and extreme right. When the government, faced with its fear of a Communist takeover, asked veterans' organisations to suppress Communist uprisings in Bremen, Berlin and Munich, von Schleicher was among the figures who misled the nation into believing that the vigilantes acted on their own.[5]

In 1920 Groener retired and was replaced by von Seekt as head of the German Army. Von Schleicher stayed on, although he and his new commander held opposing views on the role of the army in the times of crisis. Whereas Groener and von Schleicher were prepared to intervene to bolster the government, von Seekt showed, in the Kapp putsch of March 1920, that in instances involving attacks by the rightwing he was not prepared to be involved. Von Seekt in fact, "spoke out firmly against the army involving itself in what he saw was a political battle. He put the interests of the army before his duty to defend the government."[6] Despite this difference of attitude the two men were united in their attempts to circumvent the disarmament provisions of the Treaty of Versailles.

Intrigue against the Treaty of Versailles

Because the Treaty of Versailles had placed extremely severe restrictions on the size and activities of the German Army, Germany felt vulnerable to both internal and external aggression. Claiming that the 100000-man army allowed under the treaty was insufficient to protect its eastern boundaries, Schleicher and von Seekt set up secret formations of freikorps, under the guise of labour battalions. When Poland attacked eastern Germany, Schleicher sent defence forces disguised as agricultural workers to guard against possible invasion. Thus, according to Passant, "was formed, within the Berlin-Brandenburg Military District, the 20,000-strong force of Arbeits-Kommandos - later known as the 'Black Reichswehr'."[7]

There were other ways in which Schleicher was involved in breaking the spirit of the Versailles Treaty through the 1920s. For example, when von Seekt began negotiations for a secret agreement which resulted in the Treaty of Rapallo (1922) with Russia, it was von Schleicher who conducted them.[8] This treaty was far more important to Germany than it was to Russia. It allowed Germany to avoid the disarmament imposed upon her by the Treaty of Versailles. Secret arrangements provided that, in return for an annual payment, selected German officers, Special Group R (Sondergruppe-R) could be sent to Russia and trained in the handling of heavy artillery, tanks and military aircraft, all the weapons that Germany was specifically forbidden to own. Even a flying school for German officers was established outside Moscow (Sommerville: 107). At the same time, in Russia, the Society for the Encouragement of Industrial Undertakings (Gefu) organised the production of war materials, including poison gas.[9]

Schleicher's support of the government continued in 1923 at the time of Hitler's putsch in Bavaria (possibly because one of the leaders was his ex-commander, General von Ludendorff). When French violence in the Rhineland caused the government to evoke the constitution's emergency powers, Schleicher took temporary control of the government, restored order and fed the hungry.[10]

Growth of Schleicher's power

By 1926 the ambitious von Schleicher, now 44 years old, had attained the rank of colonel. He was still a subordinate to General Hans von Seekt. With the election of the former commander of the army, Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, as President, the leadership of the Republic moved perceptibly to the Right. The problem of the army's loyalty now vanished: it was loyal to Hindenburg, and von Seekt became politically expendable. Schleicher now moved to bring his old friend and patron, General Groener, back to power by engineering von Seekt's downfall. Schleicher leaked the fact that Seekt had allowed the Kaiser's grandson to take part in army manoeuvres without informing the Defence Minister, Otto von Gessler. This action forced von Seekt to resign. He was succeeded by the less forceful General Heye. When Gessler resigned in December 1927, he was replaced by General Groener. Groener's views had been to collaborate with the republican governments but to maintain the independence of the army.

When Groener became Minister of Defence, von Schleicher became his chief political adviser. Groener set up a special department, the Ministeramt (the Ministerial Service), under the control of Schleicher. This placed him in charge of all liaison between the armed forces, civilian officials and political parties. Here Schleicher handled the politics and press affairs of the army and navy. He was entrusted with relations with other ministries and political leaders. "In this position von Schleicher not only was a power in the officer corps but began to be a power in politics. In the army he could make and break the higher officers and began to do so."[11] This gave von Schleicher enormous political power and enabled him to indulge his skill in intrigue.

Schleicher now supervised the most elaborate intelligence network in Berlin. He maintained spies in every ministry, he tapped telephones and he came to know every secret worth knowing. He also knew, from his days as a military information officer during the war, how to manipulate the press through leaks and insinuations and off-the-record briefings. Reporters found that Schleicher was a good source of information. Schleicher told them only what he wanted them to know.[12]

Bullock writes that Schleicher "had made himself virtually the most authoritative voice of the army in politics" and had "used the key position created for him to make himself one of the most powerful political figures in Germany." He explains Schleicher's powerful position: "In dealing with politicians he [Schleicher] had the indefinable advantage in German politics of being a general, not a civilian, and of being able to claim that he represented the views of the army in a country where the army took precedence over every other institution as the supreme embodiment of the national tradition."[13]

By 1930 von Schleicher had achieved the rank of major-general. His position in the Ministeramt which had given him enormous power also made him many enemies. His part in the removal of von Seekt had not been popular among some in the ranks of the army.[14] He was also instrumental in removing the ambitious young Werner von Blomberg from the Truppenamt, the disguised General Staff which had been set up in direct defiance of the Treaty of Versailles. Later Blomberg as Defence Minister in Hitler's government was to get his revenge. It seems that Schleicher's actions in the Ministeramt were to cost him his life.

Impact of the Great Depression on Germany – political effects

While initially von Schleicher seemed to support the Weimar republican governments, the economic and political difficulties of the Depression forced him to move to a position where he was responsible for engineering a series of governments with strong central powers based on rule by presidential decree. To von Schleicher and the German Army a strong Germany needed a strong government. The Weimar government, as set up under the constitution, was fractured by proportional representation and hamstrung by petty jealousies. It seemed to many to be unable to deliver Germany from its economic difficulties in 1929 which only continued to worsen. To help deal with these problems and the difficult political uncertainties that they raised, Schleicher undertook a series of actions which were to be decisive for both his own life and the life of the republic.

As the Great Depression took hold in Germany, von Schleicher looked to create a government which would deal decisively with the severe economic and political problems and still have the necessary support to justify presidential government. With the growing incapacity of the Reichstag to reach decisions in the worsening economic crisis of 1930 the government of the Social Democrat, Muller, found itself unable to govern effectively. When Hindenburg refused to support his request for use of Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution which authorised the President to rule by decree whenever it was necessary for the maintenance of public order, Muller resigned. Powers of state now passed increasingly into the hands of the 83-year-old President von Hindenburg and, because of his age and increasing mental lapses, into the hands of his advisers, his corrupt son, Oskar, the presidential secretary Otto Meissner and most importantly, Kurt von Schleicher. It was Schleicher who used his position with the President to persuade him to appoint Dr Heinrich Brüning as the new chancellor.

The selection of Brüning signalled the end of democratic government in Germany. Brüning now attempted to bring in virtually the same harsh economic measures as Muller had tried to combat the effects of the depression. When he failed to gain the consent of the Reichstag, he resorted to rule by decree as outlined in Article 48 of the constitution. As Bullock says, the use of these emergency powers in effect transferred the political power in Germany "from the nation to a little group of men around the President". Von Schleicher consistently argued for strong government under the hand of the President who through his popular election represented the will of the people and who had the backing by the army. "If the democratically elected Reichstag couldn't provide stable government, then the democratically elected President must." Article 48 shifted effective power to the President and his immediate entourage and reduced both the power of the Reichstag and the importance of an electoral victory. As Fest states, it was "not the number of votes but the will of the President determined the holder of the chancellorship."[15] When the Social Democrats challenged the validity of the decrees, Brüning called a new election.

To appreciate fully the next step in the career of Kurt von Schleicher, one must understand the vexed nature of the Weimar Republic. It must be realised that it was only in this period that the Nazi Party emerged as a real threat to the government even though it had grown and developed under Hitler's guidance since the Munich putsch. Prior to this the great fear of the republic was its possible overthrow by the Communists aided by Soviet Russia.

The political rise of the Nazi Party and the excesses of its followers in the Sturmabteilung, the 300000-strong Sturmabteilung (storm troopers), raised the genuine fear of civil war in Germany. It placed von Schleicher and the army in a dilemma. The suppression of the Nazis might leave the streets open to the Communists. Hindenburg would only agree to use force if there was a definite act of rebellion, or if action were also taken against the Communists. At this stage the army still could be relied on to support Brüning if Hitler attempted a putsch. In 1931 Groener wrote, "the two generals (Schleicher and von Hammerstein) and myself are fully agreed that, if the Nazis imitated Mussolini's March on Rome the army would make short work of them."[16] However, it was not at all certain that the government would be able to count on the support of the army if it were a question of suppressing the Nazi Party without the pretext of a revolt.

In his position of influence, Schleicher continued to try to create an efficient and responsible government for Germany. Throughout this period of calamity he aimed to put together some sort of strong government in place of the coalitions which were focusing on compromise (he referred to it as kuhandling, cattle trading; we would call it horse-trading). Such a government he envisaged would overcome the economic and political crisis and prevent the army being forced to intervene to put down revolution. Later ex-Chancellor Brüning wrote, "The load which constantly weighed on General Schleicher's mind was the fear...that Nazi and Communist uprisings might break out simultaneously and thus give foreign powers an opportunity to extend their borders still further at Germany's expense."[17]

Schleicher was impressed by Nazi success in organising mass support. On 25 March 1932 he wrote to Groener complaining that the socialists were trying to associate him with their activities, "I am really looking forward to 11 April - then it will be possible to talk to this lying brood with no holds barred.... After the events of the last days I am really glad that there is a counterweight (to the Social Democrats) in the form of the Nazis, who are not very decent chaps either and must be stomached with the greatest caution. If they did not exist, we would certainly have to invent them."[18] He began to play with the dangerous idea of using the Nazi movement as a prop for the existing government. Schleicher began to look in this direction to break the political deadlock of 1931.

Schleicher described Hitler as "a visionary and idol of stupidity", but he respected his tremendous following. This made him intent on domesticating Hitler and his mass following to strengthen Germany's defence posture.[19] The key was to persuade Hitler to use his numbers to support the presidential form of government. To this end Schleicher had several talks with Röhm and Gregor Strasser as well as with Hitler himself. Röhm had always been interested in merging the Sturmabteilung with the Reichswehr and gaining a prominent position for himself. Gregor Strasser had been growing disillusioned with Hitler's seeming abandonment of the socialist party platform with his courting of the wealthy Nationalists led by Alfred Hugenburg.

In this period, von Schleicher was now walking a political tightrope. He had to balance the needs of a strong democratic government against the Nazi demands for dictatorial powers. To save Germany from the excesses of the Nazis, Schleicher used his tremendous powers of negotiation and intrigue. He could either persuade the Nazis to support a coalition or try to use the internal jealousies of the party to split them. The French Military Attaché in Berlin, Colonel Chapouilly, wrote on 4 November 1931, "In Schleicher's view, Hitler knows very well how to distinguish between demagogue suitable to a young Party, and the needs of national and international life.... Faced with the forces he controls, there is only one policy to adopt - to use him and win him over, foreseeing with some reason the loss of the revolutionary wing of the party."[20]

Freidrich suggests that he was working towards a scheme with the head of the Sturmabteilung, Ernst Röhm who wanted to merge his large force with the German Army. Such a move would have given both men a strong power base. Röhm had always been interested in combining the Sturmabteilung with the Reichswehr and gaining a prominent position for himself. However, both the Sturmabteilung and Röhm were feared by the leaders of the German Army and establishment. This was possibly another reason the army was prepared to tolerate the murder of Schleicher.

Like many others in Germany, von Schleicher underestimated Hitler's single-minded drive for power. Metcalfe maintains that Schleicher held a visionary idea close to his heart:

"He dreamt of an alliance between labour and the military that would do for capitalist Germany what the revolution in Russia had failed to do for the Soviet Union: usher in a new era based on progress and tradition... Schleicher imagined that he could bend Hitler to his will. He would steal the Party's raw dynamism by offering Hitler a Cabinet post. If Hitler refused, Schleicher would woo Hitler's lieutenants and split the Party." [21]

By 1932, with more than five million unemployed, Germany's political and economic turmoil worsened. Schleicher's scheming seemed to thrive in this crisis situation. He had to use his powers of intrigue to win over the Nazis. As part of his schemes, Schleicher determined that Brüning should be replaced. Also, he found himself opposed to his old friend and patron, General Groener, Brüning's War Minister. Both Brüning and Groener had decided to ban the blatant thuggery of the Sturmabteilung, which was turning political life in Germany into something akin to anarchy. The two leaders were, in fact, responding to a demand from the Social Democratic government of Prussia which was Germany's largest state. They had moved towards the dissolution of the Sturmabteilung.

Groener's ban on the activities of the Sturmabteilung obviously obstructed Schleicher's schemes. And so, Groener had to go. Disregarding past favours, Schleicher now worked towards undermining Groener with the President and within the Reichstag. He forced the resignation of the Defence Minister by telling Groener that the army no longer had confidence in him.

The fall of Brüning

Brüning was the next to go. His removal was fairly easy. He had failed to gain Reichstag acceptance of his schemes to combat the Depression. This saw him lose the support of the President. Hindenburg was also upset by the fact that Brüning had persuaded him to run against Hitler in the presidential election of 1932. Although he won the election, Hindenburg had been greatly embarrassed in being made fun of by the Nazis who had portrayed the aging Field Marshal as the representative of the leftwing and those who had betrayed Germany in the First World War. More importantly, Brüning's actions to curb the power of the Sturmabteilung lost him the support of Schleicher who had become firmly convinced that he could win Nazi agreement for support of a rightwing government.

Brüning's fall was a turning point in the collapse of German democracy. Until 1932 the rising Nazi popularity had been contained. His position as Chancellor was to be taken by an obscure Prussian politician, Franz von Papen. The fate of Germany was in the hands of Schleicher who entered the new cabinet as Defence Minister. However, this was to prove a mistake. Now Schleicher was drawn into the open rather than working behind the scenes.

The choice of von Papen to replace Brüning was remarkable in that he was a relatively unknown member of the Prussian parliament. It would seem that Schleicher was plainly thinking more and more of doing away with the weakened parliamentary system and replacing it with some kind of 'moderate' dictatorship. Papen, he felt, might be just the man to carry out such plans for him. Schleicher underestimated Papen when he imagined that the inexperienced Papen, a man concerned largely with externals, would find his vanity satisfied with the office and its ceremonial functions, and for the rest would be a docile tool. Fest suggests that, "when Schleicher's friends, incredulous at his choice, protested that Papen was a man without a head Schleicher replied: 'I don't need a head, I need a hat'."[22] But Papen was to prove to be more devious than Schleicher had anticipated. In fact, he was to replace Schleicher as the President's favourite adviser.

The Nazis were not to be trusted. Though Schleicher planned to encourage the Nazis to support the new government, his hopes of winning them over proved to be in vain. An immediate upsurge in violence followed the lifting of the ban on the Sturmabteilung. Inexplicably, but probably to placate the Nazis, with whom he was also dealing, von Papen struck another blow against the ailing Weimar democracy, by destroying the Social Democratic government of Prussia which was the largest, most populous and most democratic of the federal states of Germany. As Nicholls writes, "One of the main bulwarks of Weimar democracy had been destroyed."[23]

The weakness of democracy in Weimar Germany in the face of determined and corrupt rightwing opposition was clearly shown in this event. The Social Democrats, trade union leaders and Reichsbanner (the private army of the Social Democrats) commanders failed to act decisively. "They were used to operating within a framework of the law, and when that framework began to collapse around them they lacked the ability to improvise resistance."[24]

The 31 July elections saw the Nazis win 230 seats with 37.4% of the vote. Even with the support of the Nationalists (DNVP) Hitler only commanded 43.9 per cent of the Reichstag seats. Still he refused to allow the Nazis to enter a coalition, and Hindenburg refused to countenance a Nazi government. Under some pressure from Schleicher, Nazi leaders like Gregor Strasser now felt there was need to compromise.

Having failed to gain enough popular support and faced with a hostile Reichstag, von Papen went to the people on 6 November. Again he failed to strengthen his position. This time the Nazis lost 4.3 per cent of their vote and eleven seats. Open clashes between the Sturmabteilung and the Communists led to a genuine fear of civil war. Schleicher and the army feared having to use the troops against the people. He now made his final move by engineering the resignation and the replacement of von Papen by himself as Chancellor.

Chancellor

Schleicher had now reached the pinnacle of his power in Germany, but was also drawn completely into the open. He moved to exploit the Nazis political setback which discouraged them from voting against the government because they feared the expense of another election. Despite his good fortune, Schleicher found himself in the same position as von Papen,without a parliamentary majority. His only power base was the support of the President and the army. His open move into political life lost him the army's support, and an embittered Papen was busily undermining him with both the President and the Nazi Party. Unaware of these changes, Schleicher continued his negotiations with Gregor Strasser and Ernst Röhm.

Again it seems that Schleicher was attempting the apparently impossible in Weimar Germany at that time: the creation of popular support for his government by cutting across normal party lines. The pettiness of the German political parties and their leaders was to frustrate his plan for a wide-based government. However, the "Social Democrats failed to realise that Schleicher was the last remaining alternative to a Hitler who was waiting impatiently outside the gates of power. In the years since the collapse of the Great Coalition the Social Democrat Party had advanced scarcely a single initiative. Now it roused itself just once more,but only in order to spoil the last slim chance of survival that the republic had."[25] Schleicher suddenly became aware that he had underestimated von Papen, who had insinuated himself to replace Schleicher in the President's trust. It was now through the scheming of von Papen, and possibly some army leaders, that Schleicher lost the confidence of Hindenburg.

Political forces had moved against Schleicher. Von Papen had also been negotiating with the Nazis and Nationalists. He had met Hitler covertly at the house of a Cologne banker and had agreed to serve under the Nazis. He finalised arrangements in a further secret meeting of Hitler, Goering and von Ribbentrop. Next President Hindenburg was persuaded to move rapidly to dissolve Schleicher's government. On 23 January 1933 Hindenburg refused Schleicher's request for power to rule by decree. He then instructed Papen to negotiate with Hitler. Schleicher had been outmanoeuvred and was forced to resign. Hitler, seemingly faced with a possible split in his party and the great expense of another election, agreed to become Chancellor on 30 January in a cabinet dominated by nominees of von Papen and the President. The Nazis had come to the beginning of their power.

Assassination

Politically von Schleicher had failed to save the Republic. Yet to many he still constituted a threat. He was now distrusted by the two powers of the German state, Hitler and the German Army. General Werner von Blomberg was made Defence Minister, precisely because he was an enemy of von Schleicher. Blomberg immediately retired von Schleicher's friend and associate, Colonel Kurt von Bredow (who was also to disappear on the night of 30 June), as well as another associate, General Baron von Hammerstein-Equord. Even the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel-General Werner Freiherr von Fritsch, who had been a close supporter of von Seekt, distrusted political soldiers like von Schleicher.[26] Schleicher, politically isolated, was advised by friends to leave the country.

Despite his apparent loss of power, von Schleicher was still conducting secret negotiations with the Nazis. In a discussion with the German general, von Reichenau, Hitler it seems considered von Schleicher for the task of rearming Germany.[27] Why then was he murdered on 30 June? The fact that Hitler was even contemplating making use of von Schleicher suggests that the answer lay less in the threat he constituted to Hitler than in the opportunity for some army leaders to gain revenge for what they saw as past slights. Although there was much talk of a second revolution by the leftwing led by Gregor Strasser and the Sturmabteilung led by Ernst Röhm, there is no real evidence of this. It follows the same pattern of fears created by the Nazis over the supposed Communist revolution that was to follow the Reichstag fire. Obviously it was in the interests of some senior Nazis and their wealthy supporters to eliminate the more socialist left group, and the army had more than a passing interest in the neutralising of the Sturmabteilung.

Schleicher may have been an intriguer and may have engineered the rise and fall of recent governments, but there is no evidence that he was involved in any revolutionary enterprise. It did not seem to be in the nature of the man. The clue to his murder may lie in his now ambiguous relationship with the President and the army chiefs. Both may have connived at Schleicher's murder. Of the murders that took place on 30 June 30, Klaus-Jürgen Müller states that there was a "fine web of political intrigues in this inner political power struggle in Germany; a web woven not least by leading men in the Defence Ministry." Further to this point, Barry Leach in his article on General Halder talks of "the unscrupulous way in which Hitler used the army's acquiescence in the Roehm purge to murder General von Schleicher..." In an interview in August 1934 on the matter of the 30 June massacre General Reichenau saw the Sturmabteilung as a political body and not a military one and commented that "for some time Schleicher had given the impression that he was really no longer a soldier." The army, it seems, had disowned the last chancellor. Finally, Walter Gorlitz, writing on Blomberg, says, "In June 1934 Blomberg showed Keitel a list of 78 names...of persons to be arrested. As a precautionary measure he advised the entire Reichswehr to come to a state of readiness from June 28 onwards."[28] Thus it seems that Schleicher's moving from the relative security of the army to take his place in the political arena cost him its protection. It also may have enabled von Blomberg to indulge in an act of revenge and blame it on the Nazis.

Other political leaders were involved in the murder of Schleicher. Irving claims that Goering not only drew up lists of those to be eliminated but kept the political and military leaders informed of the events of 30 June.

"He [Goering] kept President Hindenburg au courant all day, shouting into the phone that there had been a plot to make Roehm defence minister and Schleicher chancellor. Thronging through Goering's palatial salons, displaying unashamed relief at the destruction of the Sturmabteilung, were the monocled army generals Fritsch and Reichenau... Once or twice Defence Minister Blomberg himself appeared...Goering assured him that Roehm and Schleicher were to be arrested and tried for treason." [29]

If Irving's account is factual, then both Hindenburg and von Blomberg had undoubtedly concurred on the murder of Schleicher.

Even when Schleicher was already dead, shot by five assassins, Goering instructed his staff to describe the killing as a suicide. However, when a Forshungsamt (FA Research Office involved in general intelligence) report of an intercepted telephone message discussing the general's assassination became known, Goering advised the justice minister, Franz Gurtner, that the official release was to be that Schleicher had been "shot resisting arrest".[30] No mention was made that Schleicher's wife had also been murdered while trying to defend him.

The chapter on the life of a remarkable German was closed on the Night of the Long Knives. Schleicher held a visionary idea close to his heart. He had tried to restore Germany to its strong position in Europe. While he was continually engaged in intrigue, his activities eventually led to his loss of trust by those he needed for power. He was "a gifted manipulator, with a passion for intrigue, [who] worked best under cover in the dark."[31] What von Schleicher's network of secret connections had failed to tell him was that it was not Hitler who would beat him but that he had been out manoeuvred by others. His power base was in the army and the presidency had abandoned him. In all probability they conspired against him and were prepared to sacrifice him to maintain their positions. Schleicher had dreamt of an alliance between labour and the military that would do for capitalist Germany what the revolution in Russia had failed to do for the Soviet Union: usher in a new era based on progress and tradition. His dream foundered on a combination of the petty distrust of the parties of democracy, the tremendous ambition of Hitler and the short-sightedness of the men who held power in Germany. His death closed another of the great what ifs of history.

Notes

1 Metcalfe, P1988, 1933, Bantam Press, p. 73.

2 Friedrich, O1974, Before the Deluge: A Portrait of Berlin in the 1920's, Michael Joseph, p. 353.

3 Snyder, L L 1966, The Weimar Republic, Van Nostrand, p. 27.

4 Friedrich, op. cit., p. 354.

5 Metcalfe, op. cit., p. 73.

6 Nicholls, A J1970, Weimar and the Rise of Hitler, Macmillan, p. 69.

7 Passant,E J 1966, A Short History of Germany 1815–1945, Cambridge University Press, p. 165.

8 Friedrich, op. cit., p. 353.

9 Somervell,D C1948, Between the Wars, Methuen, p. 107; Passant, op. cit., p. 166.

10 Metcalfe, op. cit., p. 73.

11 Shirer, W L 1985, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany, Book Associates, p. 151.

12 Friedrich, op. cit., p. 353.

13 Bullock,A1967, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, Pelican, pp. 181–182.

14 BarnettC (Ed.) 1989, Hitler's Generals, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, p. 24.

15 Bullock, op. cit., p. 184; Shirer, op. cit., p. 151; Fest,J1974, Hitler, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, p. 300.

16 Bullock, op. cit., p. 180.

17 ibid., p. 182.

18 Nicholls, op. cit., p. 160.

19 Fest, op. cit., p. 299.

20 Bullock, op. cit., pp. 190-1.

21 Metcalfe, op. cit., pp. 73-4.

22 Fest, op. cit., p. 337.

23 Nicholls, op. cit., p. 161.

24 ibid., p. 162.

25 Fest, op. cit., pp. 359-60.

26 Barnett, op. cit., pp. 212, 24.

27 ibid., p. 211.

28 ibid., pp. 46, 103, 213, 134.

29 Irving,D1989, Goering, a Biography, William Morrow.

30 ibid., pp. 147-8.

31 Shirer, op. cit., p. 151.

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